R. v. Berg: A Criminal Trial Is Not a Credibility Contest — What the Supreme Court’s New Ruling Means for Accused Persons 

In June, the Supreme Court of Canada released R. v. Berg, 2026 SCC 21,  and every criminal defence lawyer in BC should have it bookmarked. The decision tackles a question I confront constantly in my Vancouver practice: in a trial that comes down to two conflicting accounts — the complainant’s word against the accused’s — how does a judge decide without turning the trial into a credibility contest?


The answer, the Court confirmed unanimously, is that a judge never simply picks the more believable witness. A conviction must rest on proof beyond a reasonable doubt, assessed against the whole of the evidence. Preferring one account over another is not enough.

That may sound like a truism. It isn’t. As Berg shows, appellate courts are still catching trial judges who slide — sometimes subtly — from “I believe the complainant” to “therefore the accused is guilty.” For anyone facing sexual assault charges in British Columbia or the Yukon, this decision matters.

Key Takeaways

  • In R. v. Berg, 2026 SCC 21, a unanimous Supreme Court confirmed that convictions must rest on proof beyond a reasonable doubt — never on merely preferring the complainant’s testimony over the accused’s.
  • The Court reined in R. v. J.J.R.D. (2006), 218 O.A.C. 37, in which Ontario case trial judges have long used when resolving conflicting testimony, holding it should generally not be relied on when assessing an accused person’s evidence.
  • The classic framework from R. v. W.(D.), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 742 remains the governing approach: even if the accused’s evidence is rejected, the Crown’s case must still prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
  • Paired with R. v. Kinamore, 2025 SCC 19 — a BC appeal — the Supreme Court has now issued two significant sexual assault rulings in twelve months, both reinforcing procedural fairness for the accused.
  • How a trial judge structures their credibility reasons is now fertile ground for appellate review in “word against word” cases.

What Happened in R. v. Berg

The facts were, in one sense, unremarkable — which is exactly why the case is so important. Mr. Berg met the complainant when he checked into the hotel where she worked. They exchanged contact information, stayed in touch, and she accepted an invitation to his room after her shift. She testified that he sexually assaulted her; he testified the intercourse was consensual. There was no third witness and no decisive physical evidence. The trial turned entirely on testimony.

The trial judge accepted the complainant’s evidence, rejected Mr. Berg’s account, and convicted him of sexual assault under s. 271 of the Criminal Code. A majority of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal upheld the conviction (2025 SKCA 85), but a dissenting judge would have ordered a new trial, concluding that the trial judge failed to properly grapple with inconsistencies in the complainant’s evidence about her alcohol and marijuana consumption. That dissent gave Mr. Berg an appeal as of right to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal — the conviction stands — but its reasons deliver guidance that will shape trials for years.

The J.J.R.D. Problem: How Courts Drifted Toward Credibility Contests

For nearly two decades, trial judges across Canada have leaned on R. v. J.J.R.D. (2006), 218 O.A.C. 37, an Ontario Court of Appeal decision, when explaining why they rejected an accused’s testimony. The case was routinely cited for the proposition that a judge may reject an accused’s uncontradicted evidence based on a “considered and reasoned acceptance” of the complainant’s conflicting account.

In Berg, the Supreme Court clarified that J.J.R.D. was really about something narrower: whether a trial judge’s reasons were detailed enough to permit appellate review. The Court held that trial judges should generally not rely on J.J.R.D.when assessing an accused person’s evidence or instructing a jury. Used incorrectly, it wrongly suggests a judge can reject the accused’s evidence simply because the judge accepts the complainant’s — a shortcut that inverts the burden of proof.

This is not an academic quibble. In my practice, I have read countless trial rulings where the reasoning ran, in substance: “The complainant was credible. I accept her evidence. It follows that I reject the accused’s denial.” Berg confirms that this chain of reasoning, standing alone, is an error of law.

W.(D.) Still Governs: The Three-Step Framework

The bedrock remains R. v. W.(D.), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 742. The framework, familiar to every criminal lawyer in British Columbia, asks three questions where the accused testifies:

  • If you believe the accused’s evidence, you must acquit.
  • Even if you do not believe it, if it leaves you with a reasonable doubt, you must acquit.
  • Even if the accused’s evidence does not raise a doubt, you must ask whether, on the evidence you do accept, the Crown has proven guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Berg reinforces that the third step is not a formality. The accused’s account must be considered against the totality of the evidence — not dismissed as the automatic by-product of believing the complainant. Notably, the Court found the trial judge in Berg did exactly what the law requires: he assessed Mr. Berg’s account in light of all the evidence before convicting. The conviction survived because the reasoning was sound, not because the complainant was preferred.

Berg and Kinamore: A Pattern at the Supreme Court

Berg does not stand alone. A year earlier, in R. v. Kinamore, 2025 SCC 19 — an appeal from our own BC courts — the Supreme Court unanimously quashed a sexual assault conviction and ordered a new trial. Kinamore held that evidence of a complainant’s sexual history, including sexual inactivity, is presumptively inadmissible under the principles animating s. 276 of the Criminal Code, and that the Crown must clear the same voir dire hurdle as the defence before leading it.

Read together, the two decisions send a consistent message: sexual assault trials are governed by rules of evidence and proof that protect both complainants and accused persons, and neither side gets a shortcut. For defence counsel, they are complementary tools — Kinamore polices what evidence gets in; Berg polices how the judge reasons once it is in.

What This Means for Accused Persons in BC and the Yukon

If you are charged with sexual assault in British Columbia, the odds are high that your trial will look like Berg’s: two accounts, no independent eyewitness, and a verdict that turns on testimony. Here is what a criminal defence lawyer in BC will be examining after this decision:

The structure of the judge’s reasons. In a judge-alone trial — the norm for s. 271 prosecutions in BC Provincial Court, where the Crown often proceeds by indictment but the accused elects trial by provincial court judge — the written or oral reasons must show that the accused’s evidence was weighed against the whole record. Reasons that leap from accepting the complainant to rejecting the accused are now squarely vulnerable on appeal.

Jury instructions. Where the trial is in the BC Supreme Court before a jury, defence counsel will scrutinize the charge to ensure the jury was not directed in a way that invites a credibility contest. Berg says J.J.R.D. language does not belong in jury instructions.

Inconsistencies in the Crown’s evidence. The dissent below focused on the complainant’s inconsistent statements about intoxication. While Mr. Berg ultimately lost, the case confirms that material inconsistencies must be genuinely analyzed — not waved away — when the judge assesses whether the Crown has met its burden.

Preserved appeal routes. Berg reached the Supreme Court because of a dissent in the provincial appeal court. It is a reminder that a strong appellate record starts at trial: objections to reasoning shortcuts, requests for particularized credibility findings, and careful cross-examination all preserve issues for review.

None of this is legal advice about any particular case — the factors above are what counsel examines, and every file turns on its own facts.

Why Experienced Counsel Matters in “Word Against Word” Trials

Cases like Berg are won and lost in the details: how cross-examination exposes inconsistency without alienating the trier of fact, whether evidentiary applications under ss. 276 and 278.92 to 278.94 of the Criminal Code are properly brought or resisted, and whether the trial record positions the defence for appeal if a conviction follows. These are craft skills built through years of trial work — precisely the kind of trials I have defended across sexual offence and assault files in Vancouver and throughout BC and the Yukon.

Frequently Asked Questions

Can I be convicted of sexual assault just because the judge believes the complainant more than me?

No. R. v. Berg, 2026 SCC 21 confirms that a conviction cannot rest on merely preferring the complainant’s account. The Crown must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on the whole of the evidence, and the judge must explain why your evidence, considered against that record, did not raise a doubt.

What is the W.(D.) framework?

It is the three-step approach from R. v. W.(D.), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 742: acquit if you believe the accused; acquit if the accused’s evidence leaves a reasonable doubt; and even if it does not, convict only if the evidence you accept proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Does R. v. Berg apply in British Columbia?

Yes. Supreme Court of Canada decisions bind every court in Canada, including the BC Provincial Court, BC Supreme Court, BC Court of Appeal, and the Yukon courts.

Can a conviction be appealed if the trial judge’s credibility reasoning was flawed?

Potentially. Flawed credibility reasoning — such as rejecting the accused’s evidence solely because the complainant was believed — can be an error of law supporting an appeal. Strict deadlines apply, so speak to a criminal defence lawyer promptly.

What should I do if I’m charged with sexual assault in BC?

Exercise your right to silence, do not contact the complainant, and retain experienced defence counsel before your first court appearance. Early decisions — including Crown election, bail conditions, and evidentiary applications — can shape the entire case.

This article is general legal information, not legal advice, and reading it does not create a solicitor-client relationship. Sexual assault allegations carry serious consequences, and every case turns on its own facts. If you are facing charges, retain qualified defence counsel without delay.

Understanding Canada’s New Bail and Sentencing Reforms – Implications for Vancouver Criminal Defence

As a Vancouver criminal defence lawyer with years of experience navigating the complexities of Canadian criminal law in British Columbia courts, I’ve seen firsthand how legislative changes can reshape the justice system. With the Bail and Sentencing Reform Act (Bill C-14) now law and set to take effect on July 15, 2026, we’re on the cusp of significant shifts in how bail hearings and sentencing proceed across Canada, particularly here in Vancouver where issues like organized crime, auto theft, and repeat offending hit close to home.

This timely reform arrives amid ongoing public concerns about community safety in BC. In this post, I’ll break down the key changes in Bill C-14, their legal context, and what they mean for defendants, practitioners, and the broader criminal justice landscape in Vancouver and beyond.


The Road to Bill C-14: Context in Canadian Criminal Law

Bill C-14 introduces over 80 targeted amendments to the Criminal Code, the Youth Criminal Justice Act, and related statutes. It responds to calls from law enforcement, provinces (including BC), and victims’ advocates for stricter measures against violent and repeat offenders, while aiming to maintain Charter protections.

Historically, Canadian bail law has been guided by principles from the Supreme Court of Canada, such as in R. v. Antic (2017), which emphasized the “ladder principle” (least onerous conditions) and the “principle of restraint” favoring release where appropriate. The Charter’s section 11(e) guarantees the right not to be denied reasonable bail without just cause. Sentencing has balanced denunciation, deterrence, rehabilitation, and proportionality under section 718 of the Criminal Code.

Bill C-14 refines these without fully upending them, but it tilts the balance toward public safety in specific high-risk scenarios. As reforms come into force this week, defence counsel in Vancouver must adapt quickly.

Key Changes to Bail Laws: Harder for Repeat and Violent Offenders

One of the most impactful areas is bail. Bill C-14 expands reverse onus provisions, where the accused must demonstrate why release is justified rather than the Crown proving detention is necessary. New or expanded reverse onuses now apply to:

  • Break and enter of a dwelling-house.
  • Trafficking in persons and human smuggling.
  • Assaults and sexual assaults involving choking, suffocation, or strangulation.
  • Extortion involving violence.
  • Serious violent offences where the accused has two or more prior similar convictions.
  • Expansion of the prior conviction window from 5 to 10 years for certain weapon-related violence.

Courts must now consider additional factors, such as random or unprovoked violence, the number and seriousness of outstanding charges (enhancing the tertiary ground for detention), and specific conditions like weapons prohibitions for extortion and organized crime cases. The “ladder principle” is clarified not to apply in reverse onus situations, and certain prior serious offenders are restricted from acting as sureties.

For Vancouver practitioners, this means more rigorous bail plans are essential. In BC Supreme Court or Provincial Court hearings, we’ll need to present compelling evidence addressing public safety risks—perhaps through enhanced surety supervision, electronic monitoring, or treatment programs. Clients facing auto theft, home invasion, or organized crime charges (prevalent in the Lower Mainland) will face heightened scrutiny.

Sentencing Reforms: Tougher Consequences and Consecutive Terms

On the sentencing side, Bill C-14 introduces or expands aggravating factors for crimes against first responders, public transit workers, organized retail theft, and interference with essential infrastructure (e.g., copper theft). Judges must prioritize denunciation and deterrence for repeat violent auto theft and break-and-enter. Consecutive sentences are mandated or strongly considered in cases like extortion paired with arson, or multiple violent offences.

Additional measures include ending conditional sentences (house arrest) for certain serious sexual offences against minors and restoring driving prohibitions for manslaughter or criminal negligence causing death/bodily harm.

These changes align with trends in BC, where prolific offenders and retail crime have strained resources. However, they raise questions about over-incarceration, court delays, and the effectiveness of deterrence for root causes like addiction and mental health—issues defence lawyers address daily in Vancouver.

Implications for Defendants and Defence Practice in Vancouver

For those accused in BC, the practical effects are clear: bail hearings will be more adversarial and evidence-heavy, especially in reverse onus cases. Defence counsel must build stronger records early—gathering character references, risk assessments, and community support plans. In Vancouver, where courthouse backlogs persist, prolonged pre-trial detention could pressure pleas or complicate trials.

From a Charter perspective, these reforms will likely face challenges. Past SCC decisions underscore that bail must remain reasonable and not punitive. Defence lawyers will monitor for overbreadth or violations of presumption of innocence. For repeat offenders, the emphasis on public safety is understandable, but it must not erode individualized justice.

As a Vancouver criminal defence lawyer, I see opportunities too. Strong advocacy can still secure release with tailored plans, and at sentencing, mitigating factors like Gladue principles for Indigenous clients or rehabilitation efforts remain vital. These reforms underscore the need for early intervention and robust defence strategies.

Provincial implementation in BC will be key. Adequate resources for bail supervision, mental health supports, and court capacity are essential to avoid unintended consequences like overcrowded jails.

Broader Impacts on the Justice System and Public Safety

Bill C-14 reflects a policy shift toward accountability for serious crime while acknowledging that laws alone aren’t sufficient. Supporters, including BC officials and police, highlight benefits for victims and communities plagued by repeat offending. Critics, including some civil liberties groups, worry about reduced discretion and potential Charter issues.

For law students and the public, this is a prime example of how criminal law evolves in response to societal pressures. In Vancouver’s diverse context—with its challenges around organized crime, homelessness, and downtown eastside issues—balanced implementation matters.

Long-term, data collection mandated by the Act (annual bail reports) will help evaluate effectiveness. A five-year parliamentary review is also required.

Practical Takeaways for Clients and Practitioners

  1. Act Early: If facing charges potentially impacted by Bill C-14 (effective July 15, 2026), consult defence counsel immediately to prepare for stricter bail processes.
  2. Build Comprehensive Plans: Focus on risk mitigation—treatment, employment, housing—for bail and sentencing.
  3. Stay Informed: Reforms affect youth justice and specific offences; nuances matter.
  4. Advocate Holistically: While tougher laws address safety, support for prevention and rehabilitation remains crucial.

In my practice defending clients across Vancouver and BC, I remain committed to upholding rights within the evolving framework. These changes demand vigilance but also skilled, strategic representation.

This blog post is for educational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Every case is unique—contact a qualified Vancouver criminal defence lawyer for personalized guidance on your situation.

Bill C-21: Amendment Resentment

On May 1, 2020, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau issued an Order in Council immediately banning the use, sale and transport of approximately 1,500 “assault” style firearms.  This action was met with criticism from firearm owners, retailers and pro-gun advocates from across the country. A two-year amnesty period for restricted firearm owners will expire on April 30, 2022, which is around the time when Bill C-21 could come into effect.


At its first reading in the House of Commons on February 16, 2021, details about Bill C-21 emerged that created further frustration and confusion among Canadian firearm owners and retailers. Described as “an Act to amend certain Acts and to make consequential amendments (firearms)”, Bill C-21 will make substantive changes to both the Criminal Code and the Firearms Act, both of which are Federal legislation, thus impacting Canadians from coast to coast. It will also amend the Immigration and Refugee Act and the Nuclear Safety and Control Act.

Proposed amendments to the Criminal Code include:

  1. Increasing the maximum penalty of imprisonment for offences under Sections 95, 96, 99, 100 and 103 of the Criminal Code from 10 years to 14 years;
  2. Establishing a procedure that would allow any person to apply for an emergency prohibition order, or an emergency limitations on access order;
  3. Deem certain firearms to be prohibited devices for certain provisions;
  4. Create a new offence for altering a cartridge magazine to exceed its lawful capacity;
  5. Authorize employees of certain federal entities who are responsible for security to be considered as public officers for the purpose of section 117.‍07

One of the most concerning amendments, and the focus of today’s blog, involves establishing a procedure that would allow for any person to apply for an emergency prohibition order, or an emergency limitations on access order. The proposed amendment reads as follows:

Application for emergency prohibition order

110.‍1 (1) Any person may make an ex parte application to a provincial court judge for an order prohibiting another person from possessing any firearm, cross-bow, prohibited weapon, restricted weapon, prohibited device, ammunition, prohibited ammunition or explosive substance, or all such things, if the person believes on reasonable grounds that it is not desirable in the interests of the safety of the person against whom the order is sought or of any other person that the person against whom the order is sought should possess any such thing.

An ex parte application does not require notice to be given to the adverse party. This means that any person can make an application to a judge seeking the immediate prohibition (and subsequent seizure) of any of the items described in section 110.1(1).  Success on the application is discussed next:

Emergency prohibition order

(2) If, at the conclusion of a hearing of an application made under subsection (1), the provincial court judge is satisfied that the circumstances referred to in that subsection exist and that an order should be made without delay to ensure the immediate protection of any person, the judge shall make an order prohibiting the person against whom the order is sought from possessing any firearm, cross-bow, prohibited weapon, restricted weapon, prohibited device, ammunition, prohibited ammunition or explosive substance, or all such things, for a period not exceeding 30 days, as is specified in the order, beginning on the day on which the order is made.

The seizure process will unfold one of two ways:

Warrant to search and seize

(4) If a provincial court judge is satisfied by information on oath that there are reasonable grounds to believe that a person who is subject to an order made under subsection (2) possesses, in a building, receptacle or place, any thing the possession of which is prohibited by the order, and that it is not desirable in the interests of the safety of the person, or of any other person, for the person to possess the thing, the judge may issue a warrant authorizing a peace officer to search the building, receptacle or place and seize any such thing, and every authorization, licence or registration certificate relating to any such thing, that is held by or in the possession of the person.

OR:

Search and seizure without warrant

(5) If, in respect of a person who is subject to an order made under subsection (2), a peace officer is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that it is not desirable, in the interests of the safety of the person, or of any other person, for the person to possess any thing the possession of which is prohibited by the order, the peace officer may, where the grounds for obtaining a warrant under subsection (4) exist but, by reason of a possible danger to the safety of the person or any other person, it would not be practicable to obtain a warrant, search for and seize any such thing, and any authorization, licence or registration certificate relating to any such thing, that is held by or in the possession of the person.

The seized items will remain in police custody for 30 days. When the Order expires, the seizing agency (police) must make an application for a Prohibition Order under Section 111(1) of the Criminal Code. This Application requires that the subject of the Order (the firearms/weapons owner) be given notice of the application, and the opportunity to respond in court. At this juncture, there are three ways the seized items can be returned to their owner:

  1. No application is made for a Prohibition Order under Section 111(1);
  2. If the hearing does not result in a Prohibition Order being made under Section 111(5);
  3. If the Order issued at the ex parte application is revoked

While this legislation seeks to establish an alternative procedure that gives the public power to seek protection from violence involving firearms and other weapons, it fails to address the possibility that this power could be abused. Currently, the law requires that an individual report their concerns to the police, who would then engage in an investigation to determine whether a seizure is necessary. When citizens assume this authority, there are a myriad of complications that could pose negative consequences not only to the potential subject of the Order, but to whomever makes the ex parte application. It requires that they take the law into their own hands – something that law enforcement regularly counsels against.

Bill C-21 is still in the early stages of the legislative process, but has garnered both support and criticism from those it will protect, and those it will harm.

6 Years Later

It has been six years since Matthew de Grood was charged with the murders of five young people at a house party in Calgary, Alberta, and four years since he was found to be Not Criminally Responsible for those offences.

It was concluded that de Grood was suffering from delusions, attributed to undiagnosed schizophrenia, when he caused the deaths of five schoolmates from a local university. He has been in a secure psychiatric facility ever since.

As we have discussed in previous posts, a finding of NCR is neither a determination of guilt, nor an acquittal. It is the beginning of alternative proceedings, which ultimately seek to determine if/when an Accused person can be released back into the community. Like all individuals found NCR, de Grood is required to appear before the Review Board to assess his progress, and to evaluate what freedoms, if any, he may be granted as a result of said progress.

Back in 2016, the Crown suggested it would be making an Application to seek a “High Risk NCR” designation for de Grood. Had this designation been imposed, his appearance before the Review Board would have been extended to take place every three years instead of annually. However – it appears that the Application was never made. This was likely due to the fact that the relevant legislation – the Not Criminally Responsible Reform Act – did not go into force until July 11, 2014, nearly 3 months after the offences took place. As such, the law could not be retroactively applied to de Grood’s case.

At his recent hearing, de Grood’s counsel spoke of the progress he has made during his time at the psychiatric facility. He has been afforded the opportunity to spend the night at his parent’s home on several occasions, taking hospital transportation to and from medical appointments, and volunteering with Meals on Wheels. His counsel submits that de Grood should be granted an absolute discharge due, in part, to the progress he has made with his mental health issues, including being cooperative with taking his medication – and recognizing the devastating consequences that would come as a result of not taking it. He has also demonstrated a high level of remorse for his actions.

Defence counsel further acknowledged that de Grood’s case is extremely high profile. There are concerns regarding the public’s reaction to seeing him on public transit, and how he may face serious adversity in transitioning to a group home.  

The Review Board reserved its decision, and accordingly, de Grood remains in a psychiatric facility with heavy restrictions on his freedoms.